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There are facts anomaly (odd) that should be addressed in the Indonesian economy since
the economic crisis in 1997/1998, mainly due to the role of the financial sector in the
Indonesian economy. On the one hand, some macro economic indicators of the real sector
in Indonesia show a good and significant developments, but on the other hand in
deepening process of financial sector development has experienced sedimentation
(shallow) or "definansialisasi". Reflected from time to time, further weakened the role of
financial institutions, such as banking and capital market as a source of financing for
productive activities of economic actors, especially business people.
In general, these definansialisasi fact is reflected in some indicators of financial sector
development. As the ratio between the money supply M2 to the National Income
(M2/PDB), in 1998 reached 60% more, continued to decline and the end of 2007, only
around 38%. Far below of the case in many Asian countries is increasing in the range
100-140%, and even the Philippines in three years later. For example, in the period
1997/1998 to 2007, the value M2/PDB between 105-140% in Malaysia, Singapore
between 90-140%, Thailand in the range of 110%, and South Korea between 100-140%.
Similarly with the ratio between financial assets (bank assets and a market capitalization
of equity) to Revenue Naional (financial assets/GDP) in Indonesia, the value of this ratio
is low and tends to decline, only in the range of 80% over the last three years. While in
some Asian countries, reaching an average value of the ratio between 160-550%. As in
the period 2007, the value of this ratio reached 350% in Malaysia, Thailand, 155%, 200%
South Korea and the Philippines about 150%.
Then, specifically in relation to the role of banking institutions, particularly in the case of
credit distribution, measured by the ratio between bank credit to GDP (credit/GDP)
turned out in Indonesia showed that low-value ratios with growth slowing as well, only in
the range of 27% , while in some Asian countries, the ratio in the range of 40-160%. For
example, during the period of 2007, the value of this ratio in Malaysia reached the highest
value that is 120%, Thailand reached an average of 90%, 115% Singapore, South Korea
100%, even the Philippines reached an average of 35%.
Likewise in the case ratio of bonds outstanding to GDP, which is only worth 15% for
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government bonds and only 1.5% for corporate bonds. While in other Asian countries the
ratio ranged between 34-54% for government bonds to GDP and to the ratio of 5-62% for
corporate bonds. For the ratio of government bonds to GDP over the period of 2007, in
Malaysia the value of this ratio reached 53%, South Korea reached 52%, Thailand 45%,
even reaching 35% Filipino. As for corporate bonds to GDP ratio in the same period, in
Malaysia reached 42%, Thailand 13%, and the highest in South Korea reached an average
of 62%, even the Philippines reached 4.5%, of which Indonesia is only 1.5%.
In particular, the facts mentioned above can be abbreviated in an analysis of the pattern of
development financing economic activities of the economic actors in Indonesia,
particularly, through several approaches. Among others, through a survey of sources of
financing approaches, the approach of Gross Fixed Capital Formation in GDP (GFCF),
Flow of Funds balance sheet approach (NAD), and the Public Company Balance
approach.
According to the survey approach, it appears that during the period 2007 was the source
of investment financing such companies mainly sourced from internal funds of their own,
reaching the range of 60%. Then bersumebr from domestic banks, on average 21%,
further from the fund affiliates, reaching an average of 9%. Other new funds amounting
to an average of 6%, then the funds from foreign banks amounted to an average of 4%.
And most lacking are the funds from capital markets, particularly stocks and bonds,
which is only about 1.5%.
The fact is supported also by the calculation results with GFCF approach that shows a
significant decline in the role of banks in financing the business world. Before the crisis
of 1995, the role of banks reached 31%, but in 2007 only 16%, while internal funds in
1995 only 12%, in 2007 reached 47%. Foreign funds from FDI, from 21%, now only
17%, including funding from the government also declined from 26%, now only about
13%. What is ironic is that the funds from capital markets (stocks and bonds), which
portions are small, its role was also decreased, from an average of 4.3%, now remaining
only 3.4%.
Two examples of this approach have already shown that during period after the financial
crisis, the depth of the role of financial sector development in Indonesia did not follow
the direction of normal development. Normally, evolved from the stage of economic and
financial system with the traditional stage, where the sources of financing activities of
economic actors, mainly sourced from its own funds or internal. Then developed at the
stage where the banks have a greater role, in the form of credit as a source of external
financing compared to internal financing sources. Then reached the stage of economic
and financial system that could be considered the highest, which is characterized by a
more pivotal role played by the use of external funds from capital markets in financing
the activities of the main economic actors namely business compared of the internal and
external sources form the banks financing.
Based on the facts mentioned above, means the development of real sector economy is
considered to have advanced quite far along or it's not supported by the development of
the financial sector. Even though there was no significant relationship between the
development of real sector with the financial sector. This fact is clear of importance
addressed by monetary authorities who have responsibilities in particular BI as an
institution that is responsible for the process modernization of deepening the financial
sector following the economic development level of society. Because if not, then it is
questionable what exactly has made the monetary authority of Indonesia (BI), especially
during this?
To say that BI did not do something obviously that is not appropriate, because as long as
it is known that is recognized or not BI had been tried in various ways to promote
financial sector's role in society through various policies with the strategic instruments,
both for the monetary sector, banking and payment system, which according to law the
right of independence to the present.
If that so, the problem where is it? A big question that inevitably must be able to find the
solution described and logic by the BI in particular, so that the people do not confused to
understand of the phenomenon of economic development of Indonesia, which is said to
have developed, but on the other side in fact has lost ground in the financial sector.
So in simple logic, as if the real sector to grow by itself according to the strength of its
own internal financial resources. In other words, it can be said, that without financial
sector, the real sector in Indonesia seems to grow by itself. If so, then clearly this fact is
something that is very confusing.
In a scientific reference, this fact certainly can not be taken for granted, because the
evidence showed that Indonesia's financial sector has grown rapidly from time to time.
Reflected by several indicators of the financial sector continued to show significant
progress. As increasing number of participants or the number of banks and investors in
capital markets, increasingly large numbers of credit and financial instruments that are
marketed, increasing profit margins and dividends are distributed banking, etc.. Thus,
apparently required a comprehensive analysis or a deep study to understand this
phenomenon a similar anomaly in the Indonesian economy.
Finally, the fact that there is now the important thing to do is find the cause why
nberupaya definansialisasi cases occur, in order to determine the best strategy that should
be done by the monetary authorities, finance and banking, so that later the financial sector
in general can contribute to promote the real sector of the Indonesian economy which is
currently the facts as if moving fast without the support of the financial sector.
